Asset return volatility is important to the macroeconomy. This paper asks whether oil price volatility can be used as a predictor of stock return volatility. In contrast with previous research, we focus on the out-of-sample predictive power of oil price volatility rather than on in-sample inference. Formal tests of out-of-sample predictive ability find no evidence supporting the use of oil price volatility as a predictor of future stock return volatility. Further analysis using rolling window estimation and structural break tests shows that the coefficients of this relationship are very unstable. The coefficients can be positive, negative, or close to zero depending on the sample that is chosen. We discuss the implications of this finding for monetary policy.
Introduction
The volatility of asset prices is believed by many to have important effects on the macroeconomy (see e.g. Phelps, 1999) . This suggests that monetary and fiscal policy should be made taking into account the volatility of asset prices, and in particular, the volatility of stock prices. Farmer (2012) has advocated a policy of direct government intervention to reduce the volatility of the stock prices. If these views are correct, and the government should be offsetting or even preventing volatility of stock prices, it is important to find good predictors of stock price volatility. An obvious candidate is oil price volatility. There are many published estimates of the effect of oil shocks on macroeconomic variables.
1 A growing literature has found evidence that oil price shocks have an effect on stock prices, 2 with most authors finding that higher oil prices have a negative effect on stock returns.
A natural question is whether oil price volatility is a useful predictor of stock market volatility. Several papers have considered this question and concluded that oil price volatility can be used to improve upon forecasts of stock return volatility. Elyasiani, Mansur, and Odusami (2011) estimated GARCH(1,1) models of industry stock returns that allowed the variance of the error term to depend on the previous day's oil price volatility. For the period from December 1998 to December 2006, they were able to reject the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient in the variance equation for five of thirteen industries. Sadorsky (1999) reported impulse response functions and forecast error variance decompositions for real stock returns following shocks to the price of oil and oil price volatility. Papers with a more specialized focus include Sadorsky (2003) , which investigated the effect of oil price volatility on the volatility of technology stocks, and Hammoudeh,
1 Some recent papers include Atems, Kapper, and Lam (2015) ; Edelstein and Kilian (2009); Hamilton (2011) ; Herrera and Pesavento (2009) ; Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada (2011) ; Kilian (2009) ; Kilian and Lewis (2010) ; Kilian and Vigfusson (2011); Melichar (2016) .
2 See e.g. Alsalman and Herrera (2015) ; Apergis and Miller (2009) ; Basher, Haug, and Sadorsky (2012) ; Chen (2010) ; Cunado and De Gracia (2014) ; Jones and Kaul (1996) ; Kilian and Park (2009) . Dibooglu, and Aleisa (2004) , which estimated the effect of oil price volatility on the volatility of oil industry stock prices. The conclusion of all of these papers is that there is a useful forecasting relationship between lagged oil price volatility and stock return volatility. This paper differs from the others by focusing on the out-of-sample forecast power of oil price volatility.
3 As emphasized by Clark and McCracken (2013) , "Forecasts need to be good to be useful for decision making. Determining if forecasts are good involves formal evaluation of the forecasts." One reason in particular that a correlation identified in the full sample might not translate into good forecasts is parameter instability (Pettenuzzo & Timmerman, 2011) . We build on the work done in the papers cited above by evaluating the out-of-sample forecast accuracy of stock return volatility models with and without oil price volatility. We investigate the stability of the parameters of the relationship through time. Full-sample Granger causality test results, along with the other in-sample evaluation techniques applied in the previous literature, can be misleading in the presence of parameter instability, and we find that to be the case.
The most important result to emerge from our analysis is that the relationship between oil price volatility and stock return volatility is unstable. Rolling window regression estimates show that the coefficients vary substantially over time. The variation in the parameter estimates is so substantial that it is possible to find any desired correlation between the variables -positive, negative, or zero -simply by choosing an appropriate subsample of the data. Structural break tests reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability for the S&P 500, the CRSP value-weighted index, and industry-level returns for 49 sectors that cover nearly all of the economy. Formal tests of out-of-sample predictive ability that exclude the 2008-2009 financial crisis period find no support for the use of oil price volatility as a predictor of stock return volatility. On the basis of our findings of parameter instability and the failure of models with oil price volatility to consistently improve out-of-sample forecasts of stock return volatility in the past, and in contrast to the existing literature, we conclude that there is no basis for using oil price volatility as a predictor of stock return volatility. Figure 1 plots the realized volatility series of WTI price change as well as the S&P 500 and the CRSP returns for the period January 1986 to April 2015.
Data
Realized volatility has been used as a measure of volatility in the existing literature (see e.g. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, & Labys, 2003; Schwert, 1989.) .
One might question the decision to use realized volatily measures rather than the popular GARCH family of volatility models. There is no obvious reason to prefer a GARCH model. The advantage of using a realized volatily measure is that it is consistent with the real-time nature of an actual forecasting exercise. That can be done with GARCH models, but only if one sacrifices efficiency, and it is unclear what would be gained from doing so. Second, even if one were willing to estimate a GARCH model using small subsamples of the data, the realized volatility measures would be able to take full advantage of the rich information available in the daily data, while the GARCH model would discard all intramonthly data. This was one of the motivations for introducing realized volatility (Andersen et al., 2003) . If the goal of our paper were instead to estimate a volatility model using the full sample of data, a GARCH model would be a natural starting point. 
a: WTI

Contemporaneous Relationship
Following Den Haan (2000), we measure the comovement between stock return volatility and oil price volatility as the correlation of the residuals of a vector autoregressive (VAR) model:
(1)
where s t and w t are the realized volatility of the S&P 500 return and change in the price of WTI, respectively, in month t. There is a positive, statistically significant correlation between the two series, with an adjusted R-squared of 0.37. We can offer no interpretation beyond that without imposing additional assumptions; the correlation could be due to the effect of oil price volatility on the stock market, changes in the macroeconomy causing the two series to move together, or some combination of the two. The relationship in Figure 2 is consistent with the negative effect of oil price shocks on stock returns that has been documented in the literature.
We have estimated the same regressions for the CRSP value-weighted index return and the 49 industry portfolio returns. Table 2 contains the estimated coefficients and adjusted R-squared values for all industries. The results for the CRSP value-weighted index are virtually identical to those for the S&P 500. All estimates of β reported in Table 2 are positive, covering a range from 0.05 to 0.18, and the t-statistics are less than 1.96 for only two industries. The largest adjusted R-squared, for the consumer goods portfolio, is 0.40. It is not surprising that oil price volatility explains so much of the volatility of the consumer goods sector, as higher energy prices often crowd out other forms of discretionary spending (see e.g. Gicheva, Hastings, & Villas-Boas, 2010) . 
Granger Causality Tests
The previous section established a strong contemporaneous relationship between oil price volatility and stock return volatility. We now turn to the question of whether there is a forecasting relationship between the two variables. We begin by testing for Granger causality from oil price volatility (σ oil ) to stock return volatility (σ stock ). We estimate regressions of the form
and test H 0 : γ = 0.
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Intuitively, we expect oil price volatility to be useful as a predictor of stock return volatility (γ = 0) if (i) oil price volatility at time t has an effect on future observations of macroeconomic variables, interest rates, or other fundamental determinants of stock returns, and (ii) lagged stock return volatility does not adequately capture that information.
A non-zero value of γ does not violate common definitions of market efficiency, which may rule out predictability of stock returns, but not stock return volatility.
Testing for predictability using a Granger causality test is a standard approach in the econometrics literature (see e.g. Hamilton, 1994) . Alternatively, we could test for predictability by regressing the stock return volatility on only lagged oil price volatility:
This is similar to the model Driesprong, Jacobsen, and Maat (2008) would be strongly correlated across time, there is no reason to expect that to translate into a forecasting relationship, because lagged stock return volatility could fully account for macroeconomic volatility.
7 The lag length was selected by the Schwarz information criterion.
In practice, it is almost certain that γ A will be different from zero regardless of the usefulness of oil price volatility as a predictor of stock return volatility. We have shown above that oil price volatility is strongly contemporaneously correlated with stock return volatility, and it is well-known (see below for additional evidence) that stock return volatility is a serially correlated process, so we expect rejection of γ A = 0 no matter the value of γ. γ A will be picking up the predictive power of lagged stock return volatility even when lagged oil price volatility reveals nothing about future stock return volatility. In Table 3 are the estimates of equations (4) and (5) for the S&P 500 and CRSP. In both cases, γ A is significant at a 5% level, with t-statistics greater than 5, but γ is not. The point estimates of γ A are several times larger than the point estimates of γ in both cases.
As explained above, it is not surprising to see significant estimates of γ A , given estimates of β that show the importance of the autoregressive term in (4), and given the strong contemporaneous correlation of σ stock and σ oil .
It is possible that the aggregate results are masking predictability at the industry level. Table 4 presents results for all 49 industries. We are able to reject the null hypothesis of no Granger causality for six industries, with a positive coefficient in all cases, as expected, including several which are heavily energy-dependent or related to transportation:
recreation, shipbuilding and railroad equipment, and shipping containers. This is broadly consistent with the findings of previous studies. One drawback of the results reported in Table 4 is that it treats all oil price movements the same. Following the pioneering work of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Park (2009) , it has been common for researchers to allow shocks to oil supply and oil demand to have different effects on the macroeconomy and on stock returns. There is no reason to believe that oil price volatility due to oil demand shocks (which reflect shocks to world economic activity) will have the same effect on stock return volatility as oil price volatility due to concerns about present and future oil supplies. We have reestimated equation (4) including a measure of the volatility of oil demand:
where σ REA,t−1 is the fitted GARCH(1,1) volatility of the real economic activity index in Kilian (2009) , updated to the end of our dataset. 8 The results, reported in Table 5, suggest that the oil supply/oil demand distinction has no effect on our conclusions. 
Parameter Stability
A central concern when forecasting is that the parameters of the model should be stable over time (see e.g. Clark & McCracken, 2013) . There are two reasons to be concerned about parameter instability with the stock return volatility-oil price volatility relationship in particular. First, a one-time event like the U.S. financial crisis could make it harder to find evidence of predictability in the full sample (due to outlier behavior) or easier (if there was a strong correlation between the variables only during the crisis). Second, the price of oil is driven by multiple shocks, including oil supply and aggregate demand shocks, and the relative importance of those shocks will change over time. A Granger causality test using the full sample might reject γ = 0 in equation (4), even though oil price volatility is not useful as a predictor of stock return volatility, or vice versa.
To get an overview of the degree of stability of the coefficient estimates, Figure 3 presents plots of 10-year rolling window estimates of γ in equation (4) Table 6 , with the S&P 500 and CRSP included for comparison purposes.
For each industry portfolio, we report the smallest γ, the largest γ, and the p-value for the sup-F test of Andrews (1993) for a structural break at an unknown date. Our findings for the S&P 500 and CRSP indices carry through to all of the sectors, with γ changing signs in all but four cases, and even for those four industries, the estimates of γ cover a range of similar width to the estimates for the S&P 500. The null hypothesis of no structural break is rejected for every return volatility series. This is further evidence that Granger causality test results for the full sample are not a reliable way to assess the usefulness of oil price volatility as a predictor of stock return volatility.
a: S&P 500
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Out-Of-Sample Forecast Evaluation
Motivated by the parameter instability found in the previous section, we do a comparison of the out-of-sample forecast performance of an autoregressive model:
against that of an ARX model that includes lagged oil price volatility:
We split the sample into an initial estimation period of January 1986 to December 1999, and a validation period of January 2000 to April 2015. The two models were estimated recursively, using all data that would have been available at the time a forecast was made.
To make the initial forecasts, both models were estimated using data from January 1986 to December 1999, and the estimated models were used to make forecasts of σ stock in January 2000. The dataset was updated to include data through January 2000, the two models were reestimated, and forecasts were made of σ stock in February 2000. The process was repeated until forecasts of σ stock were produced for all 184 observations in the validation period.
How Different Are In-Sample and Out-Of-Sample Forecasts?
We begin by asking how different the in-sample and out-of-sample stock return volatility forecasts are. On one hand, it is more convenient to do inference on in-sample predictions.
In practice, however, all stock return forecasts are by definition made in an out-of-sample fashion, so it is only reasonable to draw conclusions from in-sample analysis if the two methods produce forecasts that are about the same. One metric for measuring the quality of approximation provided by in-sample forecasts is the mean absolute percentage difference in the forecasts: 
M axAP D gives a measure of the riskiness of doing inference using in-sample predictions rather than out-of-sample forecasts, by providing information about the worst possible outcome. It is in the cases where the two forecasts diverge substantially that portfolio decisions would be affected the most.
The results, presented in Table 7 , can be summarized as follows. For some sectors, the mean difference in forecasts is quite small. That is not surprising, because the weight put on the oil price volatility term is close to zero for those sectors, so it doesn't make much difference how the forecasts are constructed. For other sectors the difference is important, representing an average deviation of about 10% across all observations. The maximum difference in the forecasts exceeds 20% of volatility in most sectors, with some as high as 100%. Looking at the average difference across all observations masks the large differences that occur in the time periods when the parameters are changing. Focusing exclusively on in-sample predictions is a dangerous proposition in the presence of parameter instability. 
Forecast Evaluation Results
Letting σ stock,it be the out-of-sample forecast of stock return volatility from model i in month t, the out-of-sample forecast error for model i in month t, e it , can be calculated as
The forecast errors for the two models (scaled by 1000 for readability) can be found in Following Diebold and Mariano (1995) , a common approach to comparing forecasting models is to calculate the loss differential series. For our models, assuming MSE loss, the loss differential series is
A positive value of d t indicates that the forecast loss associated with the month t AR model forecast was greater, a negative value indicates that the ARX model forecast loss was greater, and a value of zero indicates that the models forecast equally well. Figure 5 is a plot of the loss differential series. It is in most cases small relative to the squared forecast errors and there is no obvious tendency for it to be positive. 10 The pattern of the loss differential series in Figure 5 suggests that the financial crisis and the period 10 The loss differential series is positive (a smaller loss associated with the ARX model forecast) 55% of the time. The MSE for the ARX model is 23.2, the MSE for the AR model is 23.4, and the MSE ratio for the two models is 0.99. that followed may have been different from the rest of the sample. We accommodate this by using dummies to allow the relative forecast performance of the two models to be different during the crisis period. In Table 8 are estimates of the regressions
Difference In Forecast
where I 
The estimates in column 1 of Table 8 confirm that the AR model has a larger MSE for the full out-of-sample period. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest that the difference in A Diebold and Mariano (DM: 1995) comparison of the models could be done using the estimates of α in Table 8 . The downside of that approach is that the distribution of the DM statistic is nonstandard when the models are nested. We instead apply the ENC-NEW test of Clark and McCracken (2001) to test the null hypothesis that the two models forecast equally well against the alternative that the ARX model forecasts have a lower MSE. We do the test for the S&P 500, CRSP, and each of the 49 industry portfolios.
The AIC and SIC select a lag length of one, but to confirm that our results are not sensitive to this choice, we also report results for a lag length of two. The tabulated 95% critical values provided in Clark and McCracken (2001) are 2.234 for one lag and 2.709 for two lags.
The ENC-NEW test statistics can be found in any of the industries when using a longer lag length.
Except for the Candy and Soda industry, stock return volatility forecasts cannot be improved by accounting for oil price volatility. The relationship is plagued by instabilities following from the greater volatility of the financial crisis period. 
Conclusions
This paper has revisited the question of whether oil price volatility is useful as a predictor of stock price volatility. There is a strong, positive contemporaneous relationship between the two volatility series. Consistent with previous studies, there is clear evidence of a predictive relationship when doing inference on the full sample.
The results are different when we evaluate of the ability of oil price volatility to improve out-of-sample forecasts of stock return volatility. Formal out-of-sample predictive ability tests find no evidence that oil price volatility can be used to improve forecasts of stock return volatility. 11 Further investigation reveals that the relationship between the two volatility series fluctuates wildly through time. 12 The changes in the relationship are not just in magnitude, but also in sign. One could find a strong positive relationship, a strong negative relationship, or no relationship at all, simply by choosing an appropriate subsample. Therefore, in spite of the reasonableness of the argument that there should be a link between stock market volatility and oil market volatility, we conclude that it cannot be exploited in practice.
13
Our results provide no support for the hypothesis that oil price volatility should be used as a predictor of stock return volatility. Thus, monetary and fiscal policy authorities should not adjust policy in response to high oil price volatility, unless there are other concerns about oil price volatility beyond the effects on stock price volatility.
Not-For-Publication Appendices
Appendix A: Out-Of-Sample Forecast Evaluation
In order to confirm that the out-of-sample forecast evaluation was not driven by the choice of time period, we repeated the analysis using an initial estimation period of January 1986
to December 2004 and a validation period of January 2005 to April 2015. This sample split was chosen so that none of the out-of-sample forecasts included the Iraq War. 
Appendix B: Robustness Checks Using Brent Spot Prices
In order to confirm that our results are not specific to the choice of WTI as the oil price series, we repeated the analysis using daily data on Brent spot prices over the period 
